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A B S T R A C T
This article contributes to the literature on unintended eﬀects by adding a dimension to existing typologies:
exaggerated unintended eﬀects. It analyses the existence of this dimension resulting from the adoption of the
United States’ conﬂict minerals legislation, the Dodd-Frank act, article 1502. The article makes evident that there
were two competing narratives on the unintended eﬀects of the American regulation: the duration and the scope
of the de facto embargo. While in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; the target of the legislation) the
negative unintended eﬀects were declining, the dominant narrative on unintended eﬀects was not changing and
omitted crucial elements. A quantitative analysis shows that especially those companies that stood to gain from
deregulation did not incorporate these positive developments into their narrative. The narratives of other sta-
keholders, such as non-governmental organizations and investors, progressed together with the changes ob-
served in the DRC. The research indicates how the discussion on unintended eﬀects impacted the formulation on
conﬂict minerals regulation in the European Union. The article concludes by drawing parallels to debates on
unintended negative eﬀects in other domains of international cooperation, such as migration. It is suggested that
policy makers, researchers and journalists verify claims of negative unintended eﬀects before integrating them
into their own narratives.
1. Introduction
This article explores unintended eﬀects of the conﬂict minerals
legislation of the United States government in 2010, the Dodd-Frank
act, article 1502. Prominent public ﬁgures, such as the chair of the
Securities and Exchange Commission have argued in 2017 that the law
has led to ‘unintended consequences washing over the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and surrounding areas’ (United States Securities
Exchange Commission, 2017). The consequences of the Dodd-Frank act
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been enormous
and have led to an overhaul of the mineral trading system in the eastern
part of the DRC (OECD, 2015). Various types of unintended eﬀects have
been noted with respect to the conﬂict minerals legislation, and they
will be analysed in detail in this paper (Cuvelier et al., 2014; Parker
et al., 2017; Parker and Vadheim, 2017).
There has been a marked increase in academic interest in the un-
intended eﬀects of international policies (e.g., Burlyuk, 2017; Jabeen,
2016; Koch & Schulpen, 2017a). The Evaluation and Program Planning
journal has even devoted an entire special issue to it in 2017, with
articles focusing on diverse topics such as peacebuilding (Lemon and
Pinet, 2017), health interventions (Leenstra, 2017) and governance
(Dijkstra, 2017), and wage eﬀects of local aid workers (Koch &
Schulpen, 2017b). Dijkstra's article is of particular interest as it high-
lights an unintended eﬀect that was hitherto not debated: the ex-
aggerated unintended eﬀect. Dijkstra analysed the unintended negative
eﬀects of international aid on the quality of governance in recipient
countries. By means of a systematic literature review, those often-cited
unintended eﬀects appear to be exaggerated, as the empirical literature
has failed to identify such a link since the fall of the Berlin wall.
This article builds on the existing literature and asks the following
key questions: can one, also in the debate on conﬂict minerals regula-
tion, speak of exaggerated unintended eﬀects? If so, how does this ex-
aggeration come about? Who is driving it?
This paper starts with an introduction to the conﬂict minerals leg-
islation in the United States and minerals in the DRC (Section 2), fol-
lowed by a brief section on the methodology used (Section 3). Then, it
focuses on the diﬀerent dimensions of typologies of unintended eﬀects
(Section 4). This section also describes which of those eﬀects were
encountered in the DRC according to the academic literature. Subse-
quently, two competing narratives on the de facto embargo resulting
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from the conﬂict minerals legislation are described (Section 5). That
section also shows how the situation in the DRC changed while at the
same time the narrative of some actors remained the same. Section 6
turns to a qualitative and statistical analysis, which shows in a sys-
tematic way which actors support which narratives, and whose narra-
tive evolved with the developments in the DRC, and whose narratives
remained unaltered. This statistical analysis provides some insight into
why some narratives stay, even though circumstances change. The ﬁ-
nally, Section 7 discusses the implications of these narratives on the
conﬂict minerals regulation process in the European Union. The ﬁnal
section concludes by drawing parallels to other sectors in the area of
international cooperation, where claims of unintended eﬀects have also
potentially been exaggerated.
2. Conﬂict minerals and legislation
2.1. Minerals and conﬂict in the DRC
DRC played a globally signiﬁcant role in the world's production of
cobalt, copper, diamond, tantalum, and tin. In 2014, the country's share
of the world's mined cobalt production amounted to 51%; tantalum,
17%; diamond, 13%; copper, 6%. Congo accounts for about 47% of the
world's cobalt reserves (United States Geological Survey, 2014).2 Mi-
nerals are very important to the DRC: 95% of the export earnings are
from its exports, and it contributes to 28% of government revenue
(Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2017). It employs 11% of
the formal labour force, but in addition to that hundreds of thousands of
people are working on informal mine sites (IPIS Research, 2016).
Minerals from the three Eastern provinces North-Kivu, South-Kivu
and Maniema are often referred to as conﬂict minerals. Most often it
concerns the ‘3 T+G’, meaning Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten and Gold.
Something is considered a conﬂict mineral if the extraction and trade
contributes to conﬂict or human rights abuses, for instance through the
ﬁnancing of armed groups. In the DRC from 1996 onwards, many rebel
groups were indeed proﬁting from the trade in natural resources. An
International Peace Information Service (IPIS) study executed in 2009
and 2010 found that in 56% of the 3 T+G mines, armed forces (either
rebels or from the government) were present (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015).3
Also in other parts of the world minerals have contributed to con-
ﬂict, such as gold in Colombia and Jade in Myanmar, and prior to this
diamonds in Angola and Liberia. However, this article focuses on the
aforementioned Dodd-Frank Act, focusing exclusively on the DRC and
surrounding countries, and on 3 T+G. (Fig. 1)
2.2. The Dodd-Frank act - article 1502
During the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2010, the Obama administration
sought to develop extra regulation to reduce the risks in the ﬁnancial sector,
and it developed the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. As part of this wider reg-
ulation, one article, article 1502, was inserted with respect to conﬂict mi-
nerals originating from the DRC. This was done after intense lobbying by
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Article 1502 obliges stock listed
companies in the United States to declare which due diligence they ex-
ercised to prevent Tin, Tungsten, Tantalite and Gold (3TG) in their supply
chain from contributing to conﬂict in the Great Lakes region of Africa.
The focus in this paper is on Article 1502 of the Dodd-Frank legis-
lation, as it was the ﬁrst of its type, and had an enormous impact on the
way in which minerals are being exploited and exported in the DRC
(Bashwira, 2017; Radley and Vogel, 2015; Vogel and Raeymaekers,
2016; Wakenge, 2017). In addition, it has stimulated other jurisdic-
tions, notably the Chinese chamber of commerce (CCCCMC) and the
European Union, to develop similar initiatives and legislation (Chinese
Chamber of Commerce of Metals, 2016; European Commission, 2017).
Fig. 2 presents a timeline of the Dodd-Frank act implementation.
Above the arrow, major moments in the implementation of the Dodd-
Frank act in the United States are mentioned. Below the arrow the
regulatory changes in the DRC, as well as the main changes in the
operational environment in DRC are highlighted. Some relevant ele-
ments to note are that the DRC government adopted an export ban on
minerals from North & South Kivu and Maniema, before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved the ﬁnal rules. Other ele-
ments of note are that there was not a functioning traceability scheme
active in North and South Kivu and Maniema when the export ban was
lifted. A last pertinent element is that the review process of the SEC
started just after all the traceability schemes were up and running.
3. Methodology
To analyse potential unintended eﬀects of the Dodd-Frank act in the
DRC, a systematic literature review was performed with respect to the
term ‘unintended eﬀects’ and ‘Dodd Frank Act’ (section 4.2). Within the
systematic review, a snowball method was used, in which relevant re-
ferences (which did not appear in the initial search) cited in articles
could still be pursued. A total of 12 texts where analysed and this led to
a list of ﬁve unintended eﬀects. These unintended eﬀects were classiﬁed
according to the existing dimensions of typologies. The existing di-
mensions didn’t include references to one of the encountered unin-
tended eﬀects: the exaggerated unintended eﬀect.
To identify the two dominant narratives (Section 5), an analysis of
the non-academic literature was executed, focused on major interna-
tional English language journals and magazines, such as the New York
Times, Foreign Policy and the Washington Post. To juxtapose the nar-
ratives as laid down in those premium outlets to the developments in
the DRC, primary data on actual mineral exports and military and rebel
activity were gathered from the Congolese Ministry of Mines and in-
dependent research institutes, such as IPIS Research in Belgium.
To perform a quantitative analysis (Section 6) on who is driving the
narrative of unintended eﬀects, all the comments that the SEC received
when it launched the public consultation in early 2017 were reviewed.
A total of 281 comments were received during the consultation period.
To analyse an evolution in the narratives of key actors over time, where
possible, their comments from diﬀerent years were compared to each
other.
4. Academic literature review of unintended eﬀects
Table 1 describes six diﬀerent dimensions that are commonly used
to classify unintended eﬀects. The last row of the table indicates the
dimension that this articles adds. The last column provides an overview
of the ﬁndings of the academic literature review on the unintended
eﬀects of the Dodd-Frank act. More information on those studies can be
found in Annex 1.
12 academic studies dealing with unintended eﬀects of the Dodd-
Frank act in the DRC were encountered and analysed. A ﬁrst unin-
tended eﬀect that surfaced related to increased human rights violations,
such as looting in the minerals trade (2 documents focused on this).
Secondly, one paper mentioned the unintended eﬀect of section 1502
on gender relations, and noted that it had a negative unintended eﬀect
on women in mining. A third unintended eﬀect related to smuggling
and the black-economy: section 1502 is allegedly stimulating more of
both (1 document). A fourth unintended eﬀect surfaced in the more
2 Copper and cobalt have been found mostly in the Southern part of the country, called
Katanga, bordering Zambia (Figure 1). The diamonds are mostly found in the centre of the
country, in the provinces close to Angola. Tantalum (coltan) is found mostly in the
Eastern provinces, of the Kivu's, close to Rwanda and Burundi. Gold is found everywhere
in the eastern-part, from areas bordering South-Sudan to Burundi.
3 Major rebel groups in and around mining areas were the Force Démocratique pour la
Libération de Rwanda (FDLR), the CNDP (later morphed into the M-23) and the RaiRai
Mutomboki, and they their dependence on mineral extraction and trade has diﬀered and
changed over time (United Nations Group of Experts, 2012).
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recent literature, which focused on the unintended eﬀects of the tra-
ceability schemes, which has led to ‘dispossession’ of artisanal and
small-scale miners (ASM) (1 document). One of the studies is the odd
one out and focuses on how some authors have misrepresented unin-
tended eﬀects (1 document). Half of all the papers dealt with the de
facto embargo of DRC minerals (6 documents). Of these, four papers
highlighted the de facto embargo of minerals from the DRC as an un-
intended eﬀect. An additional two papers explored the impact of this
unintended de facto embargo, e.g., increased mortality and school drop-
outs. We therefore decided to focus the remainder of our analysis on
this particular unintended eﬀect.
A last dimension of the typology that emerges from the reviewed
literature, but was not captured in the ﬁrst six dimensions of unin-
tended eﬀects that are normally used, is the ‘exaggerated unintended
eﬀect’. Salter and Mthembu-Salter (2017) argue in their working paper
that in Vogel and Raeymaekers (2016) the negative unintended eﬀects
of the embargo are actually out of context. In a complete and impartial
analysis, the authors should have included the unintended eﬀects on
other resources, such as gold, other provinces, such as Katanga, and
more recent data (such as from 2014 and 2015). If these data had been
taken into consideration by Vogel and Raeymakers, the negative un-
intended eﬀects would have been much smaller and more propor-
tionate, according to Salter and Mthembu-Salter. Section 6.3 will focus
on the question of the current size of the unintended eﬀects of this de-
facto embargo.
5. Competing narratives on unintended eﬀects of conﬂict minerals
legislation
The literature review clearly shows that references to diﬀerent types
of unintended eﬀects of the Dodd-Frank act section 1502 in the DRC are
manifold. The academic literature review indicated that in the debate
on unintended eﬀects of this particular section one element stood out:
the de facto embargo. Whereas some presented this as a widespread and
ongoing phenomenon, others (e.g., Salter & Mthembu-Salter) argued
that this was ‘out of context’. Hence, this section focuses on the nar-
ratives of unintended eﬀects with respect to the de facto embargo and
distinguishes two competing narratives.
Fig. 1. Map of minerals in the DRC (BBC, 2012).
Fig. 2. Timeline of Dodd-Frank 1502 implementation.
(Source: own data)
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5.1. The dominant narrative: a de facto and ongoing embargo hurting the
population
Public discussion on the unintended eﬀects of Dodd-Frank seems to
have been launched in earnest by a 2011 op-ed in The New York Times
entitled ‘How Congress Devastated Congo’ by David Aronson, an in-
dependent writer and scholar who had focused on eastern Congo for 25
years. Aranson (2011) stressed the unintended and devastating con-
sequences of the act and stipulated how the law has brought about a de
facto embargo on the minerals mined in the region.
A narrative, such as that of Aronson, can only become dominant if it
is legitimised; the legitimisation process often involves supposedly
neutral players, such as scientists (Boden and Epstein, 2006). They
provide the ‘value free intelligence’ that is used to substantiate claims.
This process of legitimization is precisely what happened with the
narrative of the unintended de facto embargo. Both scientists, jour-
nalists and lobby organisations started to use this narrative starting in
2014 with a public letter being published. The open letter claimed the
following: ‘As a result, the conﬂict minerals movement has yet to lead
to meaningful improvement on the ground, and has had a number of
unintended and damaging consequences’ (Tegera et al., 2014). Even
though the letter was the initiative of two researchers who published
more details on this (Radley and Vogel, 2015), it was signed by more
than 60 academics, including Congolese scholars. International media,
such as Foreign Policy (How Dodd-Frank is failing Congo, 2015) and the
Washington Post (How a well-intentioned U.S. law left Congolese miners
jobless, 2014) started referring to the letter in their stories. Increas-
ingly, also lobby-organisations started to make use of this dominant
narrative in their letters. The submission of the National Association of
Electrical Distributors (NAED, 2017) provides a typical example (sub-
mitted in a letter to the SEC):
4. Sec. 1502 harms the people it is meant to protect
[…] This regulation disproportionately harms all of the DRC while
doing little to combat the violence caused by the militia…Rescinding this
rule and allowing Congress and the Executive to develop better
policies to this problem is the ultimate solution (NAED, 2017; italics
added by authors).
5.2. The alternative narrative: the de facto embargo was intended and is
over
There was also a counter-narrative on the unintended eﬀects of the
Dodd-Frank act. The academics and organisations holding to this nar-
rative did not deny that the de facto embargo that Aronson saw in 2011
actually existed. They did however argue that this de facto embargo
was anticipated and maybe even necessary in order to ﬂush out the
rebels and that this was hence a deliberate choice of the government of
the DRC. Without ignoring the unintended eﬀect resulting from this
embargo, contrary to the dominant narrative, in this alternative nar-
rative these unintended eﬀects are no longer considered to be sub-
stantially present.
In response to the open letter with the dominant narrative, a rebuttal
letter was written. The rebuttal letter, to which many local researchers
were also associated (Bahala et al., 2014; Viso, 2014), argued the op-
posite: ‘Today, more than 72,000 artisanal, small-scale miners in the
Congo countryside and Africa's mineral-rich Great Lakes Region are
back at work; can access a legal market for the tin, tantalum and
tungsten that go into our smartphones, tablets and other gadgets; and
enjoy a growing freedom from fear and violence’.
Is this alternative narrative downplaying the negative unintended
eﬀects? This question will be dealt with in Section 5.3 in which both
narratives are critically analysed in light of actual developments in the
DRC. This critical analysis of how the dominant narrative might have
taken certain elements ‘out of context’ will focus on the key area of
disagreement between the two narratives: the duration and scope of the
de facto embargo and its eﬀects on the local population.
5.3. A changing situation in the DRC, but a ﬁxed dominant narrative
One of the main and independent data sources on mining in the DRC
is IPIS research. This is an Antwerp (Belgium) based institute and it has
been monitoring rebel and military involvement in Congolese mining
sites since 2009. IPIS found in their 2009/2010 survey that 56% of the
mining sites for tin, tungsten and tantalum were under the inﬂuence of
armed actors whereas the 2013–2015 survey found that only 21% of
artisanal miners worked under the inﬂuence of armed actors. For the
gold sector, however, no such decrease was noted.
Three major changes took place that had a profound eﬀect on the
degree to which the de-facto boycott persisted. First, the number of
smelters with functional audit schemes increased signiﬁcantly; this
meant that these smelters could source from the DRC region and still be
in compliance with the Dodd-Frank Act. Second, the number of mining
sites in the DRC that were certiﬁed, and thus had legal exports, con-
tinued to rise. Last, and consequently, the exports continued to increase
(Ministère de Mines, 2016).
Table 1
Overview of academic literature focusing on unintended eﬀects of Dodd-Frank act.
Sources for dimensions: (Baert, 1991; Portes, 2000; Zwart (2015). Sources for Dodd-Frank literature in Annex 1
Dimensions Explanation Findings in 12 studies on unintended eﬀects of Dodd-
Frank act
Traditional Dimensions
1 Degree of (un)intentionality Unintended eﬀects can actually be intended, but policy makers can claim it was
an accident
No examples found intended unintended eﬀects.
2 Degree of (un)anticipation Unintended eﬀects can be foreseen, but if their impact is less and the probability
low, the action might still go ahead
Seay (2015)
3 Value (positive / negative) Unintended eﬀects can also be positive No examples found of the positive unintended eﬀects in
the literature
4 Aﬀecting whom (target group
or spill over eﬀects)
Unintended eﬀects can be both on the target group or spill over beyond the
target group
None of the studies focused on the target group of the
legislation: the armed groups. They all focused on spill-
over eﬀects
5 Degree of avoidability Unavoidable unintended eﬀects can be collateral damage. Since they are bound
to happened, they are also referred to as double eﬀects
Seay (2015) argues as the only one that the negative
unintended eﬀects could have been avoided
6 Relationship to original
objective
If the size of the unintended eﬀect is small and it goes in the opposite direction,
it is a drawback eﬀect. If the size of the unintended eﬀect is larger than the
intended eﬀect and goes in the opposite direction, it is called a perverse eﬀect.
Wakenge (2017) argues that there are drawback eﬀects.
Parker, D., & Vadheim, B. (2017) notice perverse eﬀects
New additional proposed dimension in this article
7 Level of exaggeration Unintended eﬀects in all likelihood smaller than presented or less certain than
presented
Salter and Mthembu-Salter (2017)
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What are the exact ﬁgures? Within the Conﬂict Free Sourcing
Initiative's (CFSI) Conﬂict-Free Smelter Program, more than 40 smelters
now source responsibly from the covered countries, contributing to
local economic and social stability (Conﬂict Free Smelter Program,
2017). This increase was possibly due to an increase in independently
validated ‘conﬂict-free’mine sites in the DRC Region (from zero in 2010
to nearly 383 in 2016) (Ministère de Mines & Coopération Allemande,
2016). This is also reﬂected in the export statistics: more 3Ts are ex-
ported in a legal way from the troubled provinces of Maniema, North-
Kivu, and South-Kivu. Virtually all metals and minerals are exported
with the iTSCi mechanism (a new traceability system), so this provides
a reliable picture. Unfortunately, no reliable data broken down per
province prior to 2011 exist. The year 2016 was the ﬁrst year that more
materials were exported from the three troubled provinces than from
the Katanga region. Fig. 3 demonstrates that the number of (3 T) mi-
nerals from the eastern provinces in the DRC has been increasing
steadily since 2011, and that for the Katanga province there was never a
boycott. While the data for exports of the DRC are often patchy, their
recent increase is not contested.4 However, higher exports do not often
translate automatically to better livelihoods since the price they receive
for minerals is determined largely by the international market price,
which has been ﬂuctuating.
Two inﬂuential studies question the veracity of the alternative
narrative and argue that the embargo on the livelihoods of the
Congolese is devastating (Parker et al., 2017; Parker and Vadheim,
2017). Interestingly, the data for both of these studies stem from the
immediate post-Dodd-Frank era ending in 2012, even though their ar-
ticles were published in 2017. These articles were often used by those
substantiating the claims that the boycott was still ongoing and the
unintended eﬀects still prevailing even though the data used in the
articles related to 2010 and 2011 and not to 2015 and 2016. Data from
2015 and 2016, as depicted in Fig. 3, shed a more positive light on the
developments.
In sum, whereas the alternative narrative appears to have evolved
together with the changes on the ground, the dominant narrative does
not take into account that the eﬀects of the de facto embargo are pe-
tering down. The statement made by the chair of the SEC, who claimed
in 2017 that ‘unintended consequences are washing over the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and surrounding areas’, thus appears
exaggerated in light of these statistics.
While the narrative of the unintended embargo eﬀects might have
been exaggerated in 2017, the literature review shows that indeed there
were serious unintended eﬀects of the legislation. The design of article
1502, with its limited geographic focus, its focus on desiring companies
to be totally ‘conﬂict free’ contributed to aggravating these unintended
eﬀects. Section 7.1 explains what the EU has done to anticipate these
unintended eﬀects.
6. The drivers of the narrative
6.1. A qualitative analysis: changing narratives for some, but not for others
The previous section clearly shows that the dominant narrative re-
frains from including some important changes taking place on the
ground in the DRC. We now analyse the continuities and discontinuities
in the narrative of unintended eﬀects of speciﬁc groups and individuals.
To enable this analysis, the narrative of a couple of actors who have
provided on multiple occasions submissions to the American regulatory
body, the SEC, were analysed. The SEC was the regulation body that
was entrusted with the task of implementing the Dodd-Frank article
1502. At various points it has organised public consultations, enabling
an analysis of the narratives over time.
The Congolese Minister of Mines, Mr. Martin Kabwelulu, wrote
letters to the SEC in both 2011 (Kabwelulu, 2011) and 2017
(Kabwelulu, 2017). In the ﬁrst letter, there was a strong sentiment that
the law should be postponed and modiﬁed because of its unintended
eﬀects. However, in the second letter, a diﬀerent tone was struck. He
was pleased to inform the SEC that Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act
provides an opportunity break the link between recurring conﬂicts, the
production and trade in minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
as well as to foster the responsible commitment of companies operating
in or outside the Democratic Republic of Congo. No further mention of
the original unintended eﬀects was made; a frameshift seems to have
taken place for the DRC government.
A similar change in narrative was found in the narrative of one of
the leaders of the NGOs in South Kivu, Eric Kayembe, director of the
Observatoire de Bonne Gouvernance. In 2014, he signed the ‘open
letter’ which stipulated that the Dodd-Frank Act had unintended and
damaging consequences. In 2017, he signed the letter of the civil so-
ciety of Sud-Kivu to the SEC stating that the civil society organisations
of South Kivu were convinced that suspending Section 1502 would
undoubtedly lead to conﬂict minerals inﬁltrating the supply chain with
devastating eﬀects. While there were unintended eﬀects, they had been
overcome.
Researchers Mitchell and Garrett (2009) also changed their narra-
tive of unintended eﬀects. In 2009, they stipulated clearly that there
was a clear risk of unintended eﬀects: ‘A ban on, whether intended or
unintended, or a disruption of the present economies of Eastern DRC
risks creating additional violence rather than reducing it, including
violence against the ordinary miners who depend on the activity to
survive’ (Mitchell and Garett, 2009). However, these contributors’
language in their 2017 submission had evolved from scepticism on the
potential impact of section 1502 of the Dodd Frank act on conﬂict
dynamics in the region into a conviction that the act resulted in in-
creased transparency in mineral supply chains and in doing so provided
much needed insight into the structures which enable extreme poverty,
child- and forced labour and human rights abuse, including conﬂict
(Mitchell and Garrett, 2017).
However, there are also those parties whose collective action frame
has remained markedly similar over time. For instance, the IPC
(Association Connecting Electronics Industries) had a similar narrative
in their contributions on the negative unintended eﬀects for the local
population in both 2011 and 2017 (IPC, 2011; IPC, 2017). They were
the ones who cited in their 2017 contributions the articles by Parker
et al. (2017) and Parker and Vadheim (2017), which used outdated
data, to claim that the unintended eﬀects were still ongoing. The
quantitative analysis that will follow in the next section will be used to
determine if the outcomes of this qualitative review, namely that
especially companies who would gain from deregulation stick to an
outdated narrative, hold.
6.2. A quantitative analysis of the drivers of the narrative
This section analyses which type of actor was pushing which
Fig. 3. t of iTSCi mineral concentrates exported.
Source: Ministère de Mines (2013, 2017)
4 For instance, the data that are presented by Global Witness (Global Witness, 2017)
and IPIS (2016) are diﬀerent from those presented by iTSCi, even though they reach the
same conclusion, namely that the de-facto boycott is over.
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narrative (the dominant narrative, or the counter narrative) and tests if
this might happen because some actors stand to gain from the con-
tinuation of the existing narrative. We focused on the unintended ef-
fects of the de facto embargo as this was the one that was most pro-
minently featured in the academic literature (see Section 5).
To be able to undertake a quantitative analysis of the discourses, the
case study considers all the comments that the SEC received when it
launched a public consultation on section 1502 of the Dodd Frank act in
early 2017. A total of 281 comments were received during the con-
sultation period, which lasted from 1 February to 24 March, 2017.
As a ﬁrst step, the 281 individuals and organisations were classiﬁed
in seven diﬀerent categories: (1) businesses using 3 T+G in their supply
chains; (2) business associations of businesses using 3 T+G in their
supply chains; (3) businesses earning income with the conﬂict minerals
regulation; (4) Western NGOs; (5) Congolese NGOs; (6) individuals; and
(7) other organisations, such as governments and banks. All individual
comments were removed from the sample, which means that the
comments of 95 organisations remained and could be analysed. The
submissions varied between one page and 31 pages. The average
comment length was 3.9 pages; there were some diﬀerences between
parties, with the six companies beneﬁting from the regulations writing
somewhat longer submissions (5.7 pages) and the NGOs and other ca-
tegories somewhat shorter submissions (3.5 pages). Companies and
industry associations scored closest to the average, with 4.0 pages on
average. This is important to note; potential omissions on new devel-
opment in the DRC in submissions cannot hence be attributed to shorter
contributions in general.
As a second step, groups 1 and 2 (business and business associations
using 3 T+G) in their supply chain were grouped together. Both these ac-
tors would gain from a continuation of the current dominant narrative as
the unintended eﬀects in the dominant narrative are so sizeable that they
overshadow the positive eﬀects, and therefore the regulation ought to be
dropped. This deregulation would reduce their reporting burden and audit
costs, so they would beneﬁt from it. The other actors were also grouped
together (Western NGOs, Congolese NGOs, other organisations, such as
governments and banks) as they would neither gain nor lose ﬁnancially
from deregulation. The third group, the group of business that earns money
from the conﬂict minerals legislation was too small to be a stand-alone
group in the statistical analysis (N=6), but could neither be merged with
the ﬁrst grouping (business that would beneﬁt from deregulation), nor with
the second grouping (organisations ﬁnancially neutral to deregulation). For
illustrative purposes they will be mentioned separately in the analysis.
After this classiﬁcation, an analysis was performed to determine
whether the organisations made use of unintended eﬀects in their
narrative. For 40% of them this was the case. This group was then
analysed in detail to determine how they referred to unintended eﬀects.
To determine if proponents of deregulation pronounced themselves
signiﬁcantly diﬀerently with respect to unintended eﬀects, two-tailed T-
tests assuming equal variances were executed. A full overview of all the
comments that were included in the analysis, as well as how they were
classiﬁed, can be found in Appendix 2.
Table 2 indicates that companies that have an interest in dereg-
ulation referred to the unintended eﬀects of the legislation in 48% of
the submissions, whereas NGOs and other stakeholders did so only in
27% of the cases. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.5
Table 3 provides some very interesting insights into what the var-
ious organisations mentioned, or did not mention, when they discussed
the unintended eﬀects of the regulation. Of the 20 companies and in-
dustry associations that referred to unintended eﬀects, 80% did not
mention the fact that the de-facto embargo is over or petering down.
For the NGOs and the others (banks, governments), this was only 33%.
In the majority of their comments, it was made clear that unintended
eﬀects have existed in the past, but that this is no longer the case. It is
not clear why 33% of the remaining NGOs and others didn’t incorporate
recent changes in their narrative. The two-tailed T-test of diﬀerence
showed that this was signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The main ﬁnding from this analysis is that entities that stand to
beneﬁt from a certain frame (in this case the dominant unintended
eﬀects discourse) tended to support the dominant narrative. Even
though the facts on the ground change, they will aim to maintain the
status quo of the dominant narrative, if that suits their interest.
Interestingly, of the six companies that are beneﬁting from the Dodd-
Frank Act, ﬁve noted unintended eﬀects. None of those ﬁve companies
failed to mention that the de-facto boycott was over and hence sup-
ported the alternative narrative. This seems to corroborate the ﬁnding
that on average organisations that can beneﬁt from a narrative on un-
intended eﬀects use it.6
This article does not argue that all narratives of all organisations are
uniquely driven by their interests. As Section 6.1 demonstrates, actors
that do not have a ﬁnancial interest in either regulation or deregulation
have evolved in their narrative over time, which might indicate that
there is a space for genuine learning.7 This article is neither of the
opinion that only those in favour of deregulation are making use of
exaggerated narratives. Seay (Seay, 2015) has focused her analyses on
those that were seeking the regulation and shows that they been in
Table 2
Analysis of occurrence of unintended eﬀects.
Number of organisations Average number of pages of
comments
Mention of unintended
eﬀects
P(T<=t) two-tailed (on mention of
unintended eﬀects)
Firms using 3 T+G & industry
associations
42 4.0 48% 0.043**
NGOs (Western and Congolese) &
other
47 3.53 27%
** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level
Table 3
Analysis of unintended eﬀect of the ‘de facto embargo’.
N Omitting changes
in the DRC
P(T<=t) two-
tailed
Firms using 3 T+G & industry
associations & mentioning
unintended eﬀects
20 80% 0.007***
NGOs (Western and Congolese) &
others & mentioning unintended
eﬀects
12 33%
*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level
5 Interestingly, the companies that are beneﬁting from this regulation, such as those
involved in supply chain due diligence consultation, referred in two-thirds of the cases to
the unintended eﬀects of the legislation.
6 A robustness check that was executed was to split up the sample of NGOs into two
subgroups: Western NGOs and Congolese NGOs: 24 NGOs belonged to the former cate-
gory and eight to the latter. This was a useful extra check, as there might be a diﬀerence
of opinion between the two, with the former group being more interested in cutting the
trade in conﬂict minerals, and the latter more interested in stimulating responsible mi-
neral extraction (Radley, 2016). However, an analysis of the narratives on unintended
eﬀects in their comments did not display any major diﬀerences; their answers were
markedly similar.
7 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this contribution.
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certain instances engaged in ‘policy-based evidence making’. She argues
that a predetermined narrative overrode evidence contrary to the nar-
rative's claim.
7. Discussion: Consequences and broader implications
The discussion focuses on two questions. Firstly: what were the
repercussions of this dominant narrative on unintended eﬀects for other
legislative eﬀorts in the ﬁeld of conﬂict minerals, especially the EU
conﬂict minerals rule, which was ﬁnally adopted in May 2017?
Secondly, does the usage of exaggerated unintended eﬀects only exist
with respect to the conﬂict minerals regulation, or is this a broader
phenomenon?
7.1. Consequences of exaggerated unintended eﬀects narrative in conﬂict
minerals
This section will demonstrate how the narratives of the unintended
eﬀects were important in shaping the regulation on conﬂict minerals in
the EU. This section will ﬁrst demonstrate how various parties aimed to
inﬂuence the negotiation process by making use of the alleged unin-
tended eﬀects of the Dodd-Frank act.
In October 2010, the European Parliament passed a resolution
calling for the EU to legislate along the lines of the US ‘conﬂict mi-
nerals’ law; and subsequently the European Commission announced its
intention to explore ways of improving due diligence throughout supply
chains (European Commission, 2011). It took a period of 6 years before
the ﬁnal ‘conﬂict mineral’ regulation was adopted by the European
Parliament and by the European Council in May 2017 (regulation
2017/821) (Oﬃcial Journal of the European Union, 2017)8.
In a forward-looking impact analysis of the proposed measure of the
European regulation the authors noted that ‘the US DFA has created an
incentive to avoid sourcing from that region, and in particular from
DRC. Sourcing outside the region is therefore a low-cost and a low-risk
business decision […]. The probably unintended result is that DRC
minerals continue to be exported, yet informally and at very low prices,
to countries from which sourcing is considered conﬂict free’ (European
Commission, 2014a; p.29). Hence the EU regulators were keenly aware
of the potential negative unintended eﬀects. Therefore, the Oeko In-
stitute, which was asked to perform an analysis of the Dodd-Frank act to
prepare the EU regulation argued that the European Union had the
opportunity to develop an alternative approach eﬀectively contributing
to stabilising the DR Congo while avoiding unintended and adverse
side-eﬀects on legitimate economic activities and people's livelihood in
the region (Oeko Institute, 2014).
Taking into consideration the lessons learned of the Dodd Frank act,
the initial proposal of the European Commission of 2014 diﬀered from
the Dodd-Frank act in three aspects. Firstly, it chose a global geographic
scope, so as to avoid one particular region being boycotted. It focused
on all ‘conﬂict aﬀected and high risk areas’. Secondly, it opted for a risk
based approach. Thus, companies would not be asked to claim that their
products were ‘conﬂict free’, but they needed to show that they had a
due diligence system in place in line with the OECD Due Diligence
guidance on mineral trade from conﬂict aﬀected and high risk areas.
Lastly, they proposed a voluntary self-certiﬁcation approach. By not
making it mandatory for importers, this de facto embargo eﬀect was
sought to be avoided (European Commission, 2014b).
After this initial proposal, various parties shared their views on the
unintended eﬀects, including the IPC, the electronics lobby association.
The IPC, which had not updated their narrative, argued that the de
facto boycott was unabatedly ongoing, despite the rise in exports from
the DRC as demonstrated in Fig. 3. They supported the voluntary ap-
proach to avoid unintended eﬀects as experienced in the DRC as a result
of the Dodd Frank act (IPC, 2015).
Also those who supported the counter narrative made their voices
heard. EURAC, the European Network for Central Africa, for example,
argued that the regulation ought to be mandatory stating that despite
the negative economic consequences the de facto embargo has had, it
has also led to decreased revenue for the armed groups and an im-
proved security situation for certain mining sites. Also more companies
are back sourcing from the DRC after their initial withdrawal (EURAC,
2014).
In the end, after long negotiations between the European Council,
the European Parliament and the Commission, the ﬁrst two signature
elements of the EU version of the conﬂict minerals rules stayed intact
(global scope and no obligation to declare imports ‘conﬂict free’). With
respect to the voluntary vs. mandatory nature of the regulation, a
compromise was reached. It was decided that for some actors (the
importers) the regulation would be mandatory, whereas for the
downstream, e.g. electronics ﬁrms operating at the consumer end of the
supply chain, users it would be voluntary. In reaching this compromise,
negotiators from all sides regularly used the competing narratives on
unintended eﬀects (e.g. Ploumen, 2014).
The EU conﬂict minerals regulation process provides an interesting
insight into how to potentially attenuate negative unintended eﬀects,
especially ‘stigmatisation eﬀects’. The de-facto embargo is one of those
stigmatisation eﬀects. Instead of singling out a speciﬁc country or re-
gion, such as the DRC, it gave the regulation a global scope, reducing
the potential for stigmatisation.
7.2. Broader implications of exaggerated unintended eﬀects narratives
This section will highlight that the discussion on unintended eﬀects,
and their alleged exaggeration, is also occurring in other domains of
international cooperation.
The narrative of unintended eﬀects of public action has been a
pervasive one, and has been used in a variety of domains to argue for a
roll-back of regulation or other forms of collective action. An interesting
example has been provided by the 2015 Nobel-prize economics laureate
Sir Angus Stewart Deaton. He is of the opinion that unintended eﬀects
of international aid on the quality of governance are so great that aid
should be reduced as soon as possible (Deaton, 2014). A detailed meta-
analysis on the unintended eﬀects of aid on governance, however, has
shown that the unintended eﬀects Sir Deaton referred to were ex-
aggerated (Dijkstra, 2017). The ﬁndings of this article, namely that
special interests might contribute to this exaggeration, can stimulate
authors to further research the reasons why unintended eﬀects were
overdrawn in their case.
Within the international migration debate, discussion of unintended
eﬀects occasionally takes centre stage. For instance, unintended eﬀects
resulting from migrant rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
undertaken by both European military organisations and NGOs, have
been considered to be responsible for an increased number of migrants.
The Search and Rescue operations were thought to lead to a change in
tactics by the smugglers fuelled by moral hazard. However, as a result
smugglers switched to mainly placing people on unseaworthy dinghies
and had to be rescued by European navies, coast guards and NGOs —
thereby facilitating the work of the smugglers’. As a result, more mi-
grants are drowning and fewer smugglers are caught than before. It is
therefore argued that this collective action has to stop (European
Political Strategy Centre, 2017).
However, researchers from the University of London reach exactly
the opposite conclusion and argue that the unintended eﬀects of the
Search and Rescue operations are exaggerated (Heller and Pezzani,
2017). They conclude that the Search and Rescue operations should
hence continue. Heller & Penanzi go one step further in their analysis
than Dijkstra and explain that the exaggeration of unintended eﬀects
8 The full name is ‘regulation laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for
Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from
conﬂict-aﬀected and high-risk areas’.
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was driven by a desire to keep out of the spotlight and justify the failure
of the “solutions” that EU actors had proposed in the wake of the April
2015 shipwrecks; the SARs by NGOs were an easy scapegoat. The extra
dimension developed in this article could enable authors such as Heller
& Penanzi to link their ﬁndings with respect to migration to the broader
literature of exaggerated unintended eﬀects.9
It is not just in the ﬁeld of conﬂict minerals regulation that unin-
tended eﬀects play a role, but also in various topical debates in inter-
national relations (Burlyuk, 2017). Yet, the possibility that some of
these unintended eﬀects might be exaggerated has hardly been part of
the literature. The dimension of exaggerated unintended eﬀects devel-
oped in this article facilitates a further analysis into the drivers of this
narrative. Instead of noting that unintended eﬀects might have been
exaggerated and stop there, scholars of unintended eﬀects are now in-
vited to analyse what interests push scholars or policy makers to reach
these conclusions.
8. Conclusion
This paper has established that organisations are promoting narra-
tives on unintended eﬀects of regulation without conveying the full
story. In an oﬃcial submission to the SEC in 2017 80% of the businesses
using minerals or representing those companies claimed that because of
the Dodd-Frank Act there still is a de-facto boycott of minerals from the
DRC. This article showed that this de facto boycott, while it existed
before, is no longer manifest. However, these companies continue to
claim an ongoing signiﬁcant loss of livelihoods for Congolese and ar-
gued that deregulation was needed. By doing so they hoped to reduce
the compliance costs, which are estimated at 200 million USD per year
(Geenen, 2017).
Therefore, this paper argues that there might be a need to add the
‘exaggerated unintended eﬀect’ to the existing dimensions of unin-
tended eﬀects. Especially in an era with both a strong push for dereg-
ulation, it is important to critically assess who propagates a certain
narrative and if this push is driven by a particular agenda. The article
hence suggests that policy makers, journalists and researchers critically
examine claims of unintended eﬀects, before reproducing them.
Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the
online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2018.03.011.
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